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Timo Iivarinen 




The present European large-value payment systems are on the verge of notable 
changes. Since they comprise the backbone or basic infrastructure of the whole 
economy, it is important that the changes are monitored and carried out in a very 
prudent manner. This paper attempts to analyse this change and provide an 
understanding of where we stand today and outline some possible prospects. The 
large-value payment systems are described and analysed in general terms. For the 
sake of comparison some important large-value payment systems outside of 
Europe are also examined. 
  It seems that there will be significant changes in the payment systems industry 
in the near future. Options for many areas are still open but some trends are 
visible. These trends are: economic integration, increasing pressure from the EU 
and the regulators to form a single domestic market across the whole EU area, 
rapidly changing regulatory environment, rapid development of IT, outsourcing of 
the payment system value chain, increasing emphasis on customer point of view 
and efficiency. Furthermore, the border line between large- and small value 
payments could become blurred, TARGET2 brings considerable changes to the 
present situation, the scope of CLS should be extended, SWIFT system will 
become industry standard both in cross-border and domestic payments. These 
developments in the EU might mean, from the Finnish point of view, that the 
development in several places could go backwards. 
 




Suuria maksuja välittävien maksujärjestelmien 
toiminta ja tulevaisuus 






Eurooppalaiset suurten maksujen järjestelmät ovat mittavien muutosten edessä. 
Koska nämä järjestelmät muodostavat koko talouden selkärangan ja perus-
infrastruktuurin, on tärkeää, että muutokset tehdään huolella ja että niiden vaiku-
tuksia seurataan tarkasti. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan tätä muutosta ja 
pyritään antamaan käsitys tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta. Vertailun vuoksi työssä on 
suppeasti tarkasteltu myös joitakin tärkeitä Euroopan ulkopuolisia suurten maksu-
jen järjestelmiä. Lopuksi on pyritty hahmottelemaan suurten maksujen järjestel-
mien tulevaisuutta. 
  Suurten maksujen järjestelmät tulevat kokemaan lähivuosina merkittäviä 
muutoksia. Monessa suhteessa vaihtoehdot ovat vielä avoimia, mutta selkeitä 
trendejä on jo nähtävissä. Näitä trendejä ovat seuraavat: taloudellinen integraatio, 
viranomaisten ja Euroopan komission lisääntyvät vaatimukset yhteisen raha-
markkina-alueen luomiseksi, sääntelyn suuret muutokset, tekniikan nopea kehitys, 
uusien jäsenmaiden liittyminen EU:hun, maksujärjestelmiin liittyvien arvo-
ketjujen ulkoistaminen, asiakkaiden tarpeiden ja tehokkuuden korostuminen, 
suuria ja pieniä maksuja välittävien maksujärjestelmien rajojen hämärtyminen, 
uudesta TARGET 2 -järjestelmästä seuraavat merkittävät muutokset, CLS-järjes-
telmän toiminta-alan laajeneminen, SWIFT-järjestelmän tuleminen toimialan 
standardiksi sekä koti- että ulkomaisisa maksuissa. Euroopassa tapahtuva kehitys 
saattaa olla Suomen kannalta epäedullista. 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide some insight into the principles and recent 
developments of large value payment systems from the European point of view 
and to indicate what might lie ahead for the future development of these payment 
systems. For the sake of comparison some important large-value payment systems 
outside of Europe are also examined. The present large value payment systems are 
on the verge of notable changes and, since they comprise the backbone or basic 
infrastructure of the whole economy, it is important that the changes be monitored 
and carried out in a very prudent manner. This paper attempts to monitor this 
change and provide an understanding of where we stand today. 
  The main driver for the coming changes in large value payment systems, and 
in other payment systems as well, is the economic integration of the EU area and 
the effort to improve the efficiency of these systems. Economic integration is 
vigorously backed by the European Union and regulators in the area. Although the 
options for the change in many fields are still open, some trends are already 
apparent. The integration process will continue at least for the rest of the decade 
and will inevitably draw both large- and small- value payments into more 
consolidated payment systems in the area. This means that there will be fewer 
payment systems but that the number and value of processed payments in these 
systems will be huge, so that oversight and supervision will become even more 
important. The distinction between large- and small- value payments will 
eventually diminish and as a result payments are likely to be categorised more 
often by payment type, as the payment systems become more specialised (eg 
interbank payments in TARGET2, FX-deals in CLS and customer payments in 
PEACH). 
  In the reform of large value payment systems, there will be more emphasis on 
efficiency and practicality or user friendliness, than earlier on, when reduction of 
systemic risk was the focus of attention. In today’s society and in an area where 
fewer payment systems will be in place risk reduction will however not be 
downgraded vis-à-vis the new payment systems. But efficiency, cost recovery and 
practicality will clearly receive more attention than before. 
  One trend is the emergence of new cross-border systems. The design of new 
payment systems will be difficult, as the remaining payment systems have to fulfil 
the needs of many countries. This represents new challenges for the system 
designers because needs sometimes vary significantly across countries. All these 
challenges lie ahead also for the designers of the new TARGET2 system. 
  This paper presents first, in general terms, the common features, types of 
payment processing, risk control measures and recent trends in the large-value 
payment systems. After that, various important large-value payment systems will  
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be described and their development analysed. Finally, the possible prospects for 
the future will be outlined. 
 
 
2  General principles of large-value payment 
systems 
Large-value payment systems in different countries differ greatly. This is due 
historical reasons and to differences in financial structures and the roles of central 
banks. Whatever the reasons, however, there are some common basic features that 
characterise the large value payment systems. The key features of large-value 
payment systems can be defined in terms of general organisation, payment 
processing and risk control measures. 
 
Table 1.   General principles of large value payment systems 
 










Time of settlement 
Finality 









Time of settlement 
 
 
Table 1 provides an outline on the analytical structure of this section. General 
features are covered in section 2.1. Particularities of processing of payments are 
described in 2.2. Section 2.3 covers risk management issues and the last section 
identifies some visible trends in the development of large-value payment systems. 
 
 
2.1 General  features 
The general features of large-value payment systems concern matters such as 
system ownership, governance, criteria for participation, rules and legal basis of 
the system and pricing. As for system ownership, the central bank, a group of 
commercial banks or a banking association may own the system. They are all 
possible options, but as regards credit and settlement risk they pose a different 
level of risk.  
9 
  Governance consists of the relationships between the payment system’s 
management and its governing body, its owners and stakeholders. Governance is 
important because it determines how the whole payment system is managed and 
how the objectives for the whole system are set. Similarly it has an impact on the 
handling of crisis situations. From the overseer’s point of view and due to the 
ever-changing payment system landscape in the EU, this topic may be important 
in the future. This follows from the fact that often owners, different users and 
society have different interests in a payment system. The question is how should a 
payment system be governed so as to achieve the optimum result for different 
interest groups. 
 The  criteria for participation in a payment system also differ between 
countries. In principle these criteria may range from a closed club of participants 
to free participation, but in practice most systems use publicly disclosed criteria 
which have to be met by any entity prior to participation in the system. Preferably 
these criteria are balanced in a way that protects the present participants from any 
potential risk caused by new applicants, and on the other hand, fosters fair 
competition between parties in a given market. 
 The  legal basis of the payment system is important because participants must 
be able to predict consequences of their actions. Also the risks of participation can 
be more easily assessed if it is clear under which jurisdiction the rules and 
procedures of a system are interpreted. Presently there are several possibilities. 
The legal basis, for instance, can be a general law on payment system matters, 
under which all the different aspects of the payment system are covered, or the 
legal basis can be based on a central bank law or regulation. Instead of a single 
payment systems law or central bank law/regulation, the legal basis could be 
based on contractual agreements between the users themselves. This means that 
there are a number of separate laws regulating various areas of payment systems. 
In this case it is important that the set of separate laws form a solid basis free of 
contradictions. 
  Pricing in different payment systems varies. But nowadays both private 
payment systems and central bank systems strive for full cost recovery. In 
privately run payment systems this is a fairly straightforward matter, but in 
systems run by central banks things get somewhat blurred due to difficulties of 
allocating fixed costs to banks’ service prices. 
  When the pricing of systems run by central banks is discussed, it is necessary 
to consider the public good factor. The public-good factor, in this context is 
usually understood to be the systemic risk factor, which central banks try to 
minimise by running the most essential parts of the local payment system 
themselves. Systemic risk is that a failure by one participant to meet an obligation 
will cause difficulties for other participant to meet their obligations.
1 Calculation 
                                                 
1 See section 2.3 for more information on systemic risk.  
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of the systemic-risk factor is very difficult for payment systems because the 
monetary value of systemic risk is difficult to allocate. There may also be other 
immaterial factors that complicate the calculation. 
 
 
2.2 Payment  processing 
There are several ways to process large-value payments. In many large-value 
payment systems, settlement and exchange of payment information are done 
simultaneously. In other systems these take place at different times. Usually 
settlement takes place at the central bank whereas payment information is 
transferred directly to the receiving bank. However, the main features of payment 
processing are time of settlement, time of settlement finality, liquidity and credit 
facilities, message flow in the system, the nature of queuing (if any), and the 
assets used for the settlement. 
 The  time of settlement is the point in time when the settlement actually 
occurs. There can be a lag between the time when the payment is accepted for 
settlement and when it is actually settled. The choice as to when the settlement 
takes place depends mainly on how much credit and liquidity risk is accepted in 
the payment system. Present arrangements vary from RTGS (real time gross 
settlement) where settlement takes place in real time, to settlement at the end of 
the day or the next day. There are also systems that are intermediate to these, in 
which settlement takes place at designated intervals during the day. In these 
systems the payments are net and only netted amounts of funds are actually 
settled. The time of settlement finality is closely related to the time of settlement, 
because in an RTGS system payments are settled in gross amounts and clearing 
and settlement take place simultaneously. In RTGS systems, payments are final in 
real time, whereas in netting systems they are final only after settlement, which 
takes place at a later point in time. Both systems have their pros and cons. The 
main technical concern in choosing the suitable solution is the cost of building the 
system compared to the number of payments the system is supposed to process. 
Also the needs of users have to be born in mind when designing a system. 
  Liquidity and credit facilities for the banks using a payment system are a 
primary concern in an RTGS system, where – due to the gross settlement – more 
liquidity is needed to settle payments, as compared to netting systems, which 
require liquidity only for netted amounts. As far as liquidity is concerned, this is 
the main advantage of a netting system. As for a gross system, the main 
disadvantage is the risk of a gridlock situation, where the payments are waiting for 
enough liquidity to start the settlement process.
2 At present, many RTGS systems 
                                                 
2 For more information on gridlock resolution, see Morten L. Bech – Kimmo Soramäki, Gridlock 
Resolution in Interbank Payment Systems, Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 9/2001.  
11 
offer some kind of intraday liquidity facility, which is very rare in netting 
systems. This extended need for liquidity in RTGS systems has been addressed in 
various payment systems through the establishment of a central bank intraday 
credit service. There are differences in how this service is set up in practice. Also 
the fees and costs for this service vary considerably between countries. 
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Types of message flows also vary considerably. There are basically four message 
flow types: V-shaped, Y-shaped, L-shaped, T-shaped. In RTGS systems and in 
other real time-based large-value payment systems, actually only three of these 
are used. In RTGS systems the most widely used message structure is the   
V-shaped message flow structure, in which all the payment information is first 
passed to the central bank for interbank settlement. After settlement, the payment 
information is sent to the receiving bank.  
12 
  Another widely used message flow structure is the Y-shaped structure 
(especially for systems that use the SWIFT network), where the original 
information contained in the message is split into two parts by the SWIFT 
network. The information necessary for settlement is sent by the SWIFT network 
to the central bank for settlement. If there are sufficient funds in the account of the 
sending bank, the central bank settles the payment. Once settled, the full payment 
message with the information about the settlement is sent to the receiving bank. 
These two types of message flow designs differ in the amount of information that 
is sent to the central bank. In the latter case, the central bank does not receive the 
business information contained in the payment message. 
 The  L-shaped structure is actually quite similar to the Y-shaped structure. 
Only the place where the original payment information is kept during the 
settlement process differs with the L-shaped structure, the payment message is 
held at the sending bank’s processor and the information necessary for settlement 
is sent to the central bank. After settlement of the payment, the central bank sends 
information about the settlement back to the sending bank’s processor, which 
automatically sends the complete payment information to the receiving bank. In 
all three structures the receiving bank receives the complete payment message 
with settlement information only after the settlement has actually taken place. 
  The last alternative message flow format is the T-shaped structure, where the 
sending bank sends simultaneously the same payment message to the receiving 
bank and to the central bank for settlement. After settlement of the payment at the 
central bank, the central bank sends a confirmation message on settlement of the 
payment to the receiving bank. This structure entails liquidity risk because the 
receiving bank can act in the information of the payment message before it is 
actually final. This is considered undesirable in an RTGS system and therefore it 
is not presently used. 
 The  nature of queuing is also a prominent factor in large-value payment 
systems, although some systems do not offer this feature at all. Basically queuing 
can be arranged in two different ways. Either a payment system has it’s own 
central queuing mechanism or the queuing is carried out in the individual banks 
by their own systems. Some banks might even use both methods simultaneously. 
Another aspect is the management of the queue, which also can be either 
centralised or decentralised. In the first case the processor of the payments 
handles the queue, while in the latter payments are managed by the individual 
banks. In the centrally located and managed systems banks usually can attach 
priority codes to their payments to express how urgently payments should be 
settled. Payments carrying the same priority code will usually be settled by the 
FIFO method (first in, first out). In many systems payments can also be 
rearranged in the queue by the central processor or individual banks. Another 
approach is to use optimisation routines (pre-set procedures or algorithms) to 
effectively settle payments in the queue. In this case payments are settled  
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simultaneously at pre-set intervals or if gridlock occurs. This method may be 
more effective, as it provides more options for processing the payments besides 
the strict sequencing of payments. This of course depends on what kind of 
optimisation routine, is used. In order to better understand the consequences of 
any optimatisation routine different methods of queuing can be simulated to 
determine the best option in any specific payment system.
3 
  In principle the agent used for settlement could be either the central bank or 
some other financial institution. But in practice all RTGS systems settle with 
central bank money and most large-value payment systems that co-exist with an 
RTGS system settle through the national RTGS system. 
 
 
2.3  Risk control measures 
It is crucial to financial stability that large-value payment systems are robust. 
There are many payment system risks that participants may face.
4 Figure 1 gives 
the different types of risk that are usually associated with large-value payment 
systems. 
 
Table 2.   Risks in large-value payment systems 
 









Credit risk is the risk that at some point a counterpart will not meet its 
obligations to another participant at any point. Liquidity risk means that a 
counterpart may not settle an obligation when due but rather at some unspecified 
time thereafter. This may in turn hamper the payee’s liquidity management 
                                                 
3 See more about simulation in Leinonen Harry – Soramäki Kimmo, Simulating interbank payment 
and securities settlement mechanisms with the BoF-PSS2 simulator, Bank of Finland Discussion 
Papers, 23/2003. 
4 See Bank of Finland Series A:106 (2003): Regulation and control of payment system risks – 
A Finnish perspective.  
14 
because the obligation is not been settled as expected and the payee might be 
forced to seek other (possibly more expensive ) funding, if such is available.
5 
  Operational risk is the risk of errors in the information system, 
administration or organisation of a payment system. Such risk is very closely 
associated with IT systems, which are the backbone of every modern payment 
system. Typical administrative errors are associated with bank’s operating 
methods, division of responsibilities, employees’ expertise, backup systems etc. 
There is for example operational risk if in an RTGS system all auxiliary systems 
settle at the same point in time.
6 With increasing technical complexity of payment 
systems, more and more expertise is required from the personnel, which renders 
the systems more vulnerable to operational risks. Also crime risks fall into this 
category of risks. Criminals may learn about system weaknesses and succeed in 
exploiting them. 
  Settlement risk usually refers to the risk that the whole settlement operation 
of an interbank funds transfer system is disturbed so that some (typically all) 
payments cannot be settled. Another risk of this type is systemic risk. Systemic 
risk usually refers to the chain reaction that can take place when the failure of a 
participant to meet an obligation leads to problems for other participants’ in 
meeting their obligations. This domino effect can lead to broader financial 
difficulties and may even jeopardise the stability of the whole financial system. 
  There are also environmental risks that are not inherent in the payment 
system or it’s participants. These are risks of loss due to profound changes in the 
operating environment. A constantly changing environment – such as that of the 
present, increases this risk considerably. The main environmental risks are 
associated with changes in market practices, legislation or technology or with 
catastrophes. 
  The risks mentioned above can be avoided, or the scale of losses minimised, 
in several ways. The credit and liquidity risks can be avoided by using exposure 
limits (debit and credit caps). These can be used between any two participants of a 
payment system or multilaterally. Usually these are designed so that that a debit 
cap is the maximum debit that a participant can have towards the participants of 
the same system. By credit cap is usually meant the maximum credit a participant 
is willing to give to another participant in the system. 
  Another way to reduce risks associated with payment systems is to require 
collateral for the settlement of the payments. In case a participant cannot meet its 
obligations, payments will be settled by using this collateral, which is at the 
disposal of the settlement agent. Usually the collateral is in the form of securities, 
                                                 
5 See also Leinonen Harry, Interbank funds transfer systems: liquidity needs, counterparty risks 
and collateral, Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 16/1998. 
6 See Bank of Finland Bulletin, Financial stability, Special issue 2003, page 52, Chart 32, Critical 
points in time during BoF-RTGS day.  
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which are deposited at the local securities depository. Loss-sharing arrangements 
can reduce these risks even more. These kinds of arrangements are usually set up 
to protect the system in case where the collateral deposited by a participant is not 
sufficient to cover its liabilities. Losses are allocated among the other participants 
of the system. 
  In large value-payment systems, time lags in the settlement process can also 
be a source of risk. This settlement lag is the time lag between execution of a 
transaction and final crediting of the receiving participant’s account. When a 
participant has knowledge of incoming payments before they are actually credited 
to its account, it might then use the funds (credit them to customer accounts). This 
can lead to a situation where the participant does not get the funds if the 
settlement for some reason is not completed. This is a credit risk. Lags in 
settlement can also cause liquidity risk. This is because liquidity management is 
difficult if a participant cannot be sure of the magnitude of the payments it is 
receiving. The best way to reduce these risks is to reduce the time lags. For these 
reasons, same-day settlement has become popular for large-value payment 
systems. As a matter of fact, in many payment systems the time lags have been 
reduced to a minimum by introducing RTGS systems, in which the transfer 
payment information and settlement take place simultaneously. In some systems 
introducing procedures whereby clearing and settlement are carried out several 




2.4  Recent trends in large-value payment systems 
2.4.1 Design 
Large-value payment systems have changed remarkably over the last twenty 
years. The first large-value payment system design was the deferred net settlement 
system (DNS). In this design participants send each other payments during the 
day. Settlement takes place at a pre-set time, usually at the end of the day. In these 
systems settlement can be realised either bilaterally or multilaterally. In a bilateral 
arrangement, participants pay each other. In a multilateral arrangement each 
participant pays its net obligation to a settlement agent, which in turn pays the 
receiving participants. National central banks often act as settlement agents. This 
payment system design is vulnerable to many risks associated with the design of 
the system. As mentioned before, a system with a deferred settlement gives rise to 
potential problems if the receiving bank does not get the funds it is expecting. 
This might lead also to other problems within the system if the receiving party 
cannot meet it’s own obligations. DNS systems have over the years been 
                                                 
7 The POPS system is an example; see section 4.4.  
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improved with various risk reducing elements such as limits, collateral 
requirements, and reducing the settlement time lag by having several settlement 
runs during the day, when ever the limits are reached. Such systems are usually 
called protected DNS systems. 
  Increasing values and volumes underlined the pitfalls of DNS systems. For 
this reason central banks have preferred to design new payment systems so as to 
eliminate the risks associated with DNS systems. The outcome of this 
development was the birth of RTGS (real time gross settlement). This system 
design has become very widely used since the 1990s. For example all EU 
countries have one and there are now more than 70 RTGS systems world-wide. 
Moreover all EU-accession countries already have their RTGS systems or are in 
the process of establishing them. In an RTGS system the sending of payment 
information and settlement are carried out simultaneously. Payments are settled 
gross, without netting. These features eliminate the risks of DNS systems and 
participants can be sure of receiving cover for payments. There are, however, 
some other drawbacks associated with this design. Liquidity needs are greater in a 
system where payments are settled gross, compared to a netting system. For this 
reason most central banks offer participants extra liquidity. This is done by 
granting collaterised intraday credit. 
  New kinds of payment systems have evolved in recent years. These new 
systems attempt to combine the advantages of DNS and RTGS systems. In other 
words they try to combine the safety of RTGS systems with the liquidity saving 
features of netting systems. One such design is called continued net settlement 
(CNS), which has evolved from the DNS design. One example of these systems is 
the large-value payment system of France (PNS, Paris Net Settlement). Here, 
payments are processed one by one on a continuous basis. Each payment which 
meets certain criteria is settled immediately. Others are put in a queue. The queue 
is scanned continuously and two optimisation mechanisms are used to settle 
payments in the queue (see section 4.2 for more details). 
  Another way to combine the advantages of RTGS and netting systems is that 
used in Germany’s new RTGS
plus system. This system is an enhanced RTGS 
system. It is basically an RTGS system with liquidity saving features and efficient 
liquidity management (see section 3.1.1 for further details). 
 
 
2.4.2  Efficiency and pricing 
In designing new large-value payment systems there is an increasing need to pay 
more attention to the social efficiency of the system. So far, the other side of the 
coin – risk reduction - has been the guiding principle in designing large-value 
payment systems. Social efficiency here means that payment systems should offer  
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efficient means of making payments. The term also incorporates the idea that a 
system should be practical for its users. 
  Due to the integration process in the EU area national indicators of efficiency 
are no longer sufficient to reflect the efficiency of any payment system. The 
efficiency of a payment system should be measured from the perspective of whole 
EU area or even globally. This is one of the reasons why the CLS system is 
described in this paper.
8 
  Efficiency and practicality mean that not always is the most versatile the most 
appropriate in a given environment. Special features which are not often used by 
participants should not be incorporated in an efficient and practical system. 
Special features mean only high costs of running and maintaining the system. The 
system should also be practical to its users in affording them advantages that other 
payment systems cannot offer, thus giving users a reason for using the system. 
These aspects are not always kept in mind when designing new payment systems. 
When new features are added to a system, the historical reasons or lack of focus 
on efficiency can be reasons for forgetting these aspects. The renewal of the 
whole TARGET system the TARGET2-project, which started in January 2003, 
will in the first stage in dealing with these matters. 
  At present the method of pricing varies widely across different payment 
systems. For instance in TARGET the price is determined differently in cross-
border payments vs. domestic payments. Cross-border payments are priced 
similarly in all national components of TARGET while domestic prices are 
determined at national level by the respective national central banks. Hence fees 
have been harmonised only partially. There can also be additional costs related to 
extra service or upkeep of connections between the banks. The cross-border fee is 
based on the quantity of payments. The scale is degressive, meaning that the more 
payments are transferred the cheaper it becomes. The price structures for domestic 
payments sent through the different national components of the TARGET range 
from quantity related prices, with possible entry and annual fees added, to flat 
transaction fees. Some systems set their price scales with the aim of promoting the 
sending of payments as early as possible, by making earlier ones cheaper. 
Sometimes large-value payments are priced lower than smaller payments, to give 
preference to the processing of critical payments. In some other large-value RTGS 
systems the principles for pricing seem to be quite similar. For some large value 
payments the fees range from a flat entry fee, without transaction fee (POPS-
system), to price structures similar to those of national components of the 
TARGET system. 
  Despite the differences in pricing structures in the current payment systems 
the present trend in new designs seems to be towards more efficient payment 
                                                 
8 The CLS-system (continuous linked settlement) is designed for the safe settlement of foreign 
exchange payments. See chapter 5.  
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systems where the customer point of view is taken into consideration. A major 
force behind this trend is the possibility of using new technology to lower 
production costs of new payment systems. Another driving force is the ongoing 
integration process. At present with integration proceeding at all levels, in both 
small- and large value systems, the remaining new payment systems must meet 
the needs of different users from many countries. This represents new challenges 




3  Principles and recent developments in central 
bank large-value payment systems 
3.1 TARGET 
TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express 
Transfer system) is an EU-wide, automated real-time gross settlement system for 
euro-denominated payments within the European Union. It started operations in 
1999. Members of the European Union can use this system to send euro-
dominated payments. Because some members of the European Union still have 
their own currencies (not members of the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU), 
such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, they use TARGET only for 
their euro payments. When the accession countries join the EMU they will start to 
use the TARGET system. 
  TARGET was created with a view to meeting three main objectives: 
 
–  To serve the needs of Eurosystem monetary policy 
–  To increase the efficiency of intra-European cross-border payments 
–  To provide a reliable and safe mechanism for settlement of cross-border 
payments 
 
TARGET consists of fifteen national RTGS systems and ECB’s payment 
mechanism, which are interlinked so as to provide a uniform platform for the 
processing of payments throughout the EU area. TARGET provides the means for 
more than 5,000 EU credit institutions to make cross-border payments through 
their own national RTGS systems. 
  Different national RTGS systems differ remarkably having been originally 
developed for domestic use. Cross-border TARGET payments are processed via 
national RTGS systems. These systems send payments directly to the receiving 
RTGS systems. Even though the different national RTGS systems differ from  
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each other an interlinking component makes it possible for systems of different 
designs to communicate. The only features that have been harmonised are 
operating time, pricing of cross-border payments and provision of intraday credit. 
 
 
3.1.1 TARGET  payments 
Figure 2.  TARGET: Value and number of domestic and 
      cross-border payments in the EU area, 
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Source: European Central Bank.   
 
 
The monthly value of all TARGET payments fluctuated last year between 1,500 
and 1,800 billion euro. An all-time high was reached in December 2002 when the 
daily average of all payments was 1,800 billion euro. The increase in daily value 
is more or less due to the increase in domestic payments. About two-thirds of the 
payments were domestic payments. The same trend can be seen in the number of 
payments. The volume of cross-border payments has been fairly stable, whereas 
that of domestic payments has risen since 1999. 
  A significant increase took place in domestic TARGET payments in 
November 2001 in both value and number. This stems from the fact that in 
Germany the new RTGS
plus was introduced on 5 November 2001. This new 
system replaced two German large-value payment systems, Euro Link System 
(ELS) and Euro Access Frankfurt (EAF). ELS was the old RTGS system and 
national component of TARGET; EAF was the other German domestic large 
value payment system outside of TARGET. Payments from the ELS system were 
rerouted through the national TARGET component, RTGS
plus, in November 2001.  
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The rerouting of ELS payments to RTGS
plus explains the increase in the domestic 
payment component of TARGET payments. 
  The TARGET system handles the largest value of payments of all the large 
value payment systems in the EU. In cross-border payments TARGET is almost 
twice as large as the EURO 1 system of the EBA
9. In terms of number of 
payments, the situation is the reverse. More than twice as many payments flow 
through the EURO 1 system as through TARGET. This characterises well the 
nature of TARGET, which is clearly a system for interbank payments, whereas 
EURO 1 is used more for processing customer payments. 
 
Figure 3.  Value of transactions in EU area payment systems, 














      1999       2000       2001       2002       2003
EUR billion
 1 National TARGET transactions
 2 Cross-border, EU-wide TARGET transactions
 3 EBA EURO 1 (Euro Banking Association)
 4 PNS (Paris Net Settlement)
 5 SPI (Servicio de Pagos Interbancarios)
 6 POPS (Finnish interbank express transfer and cheque system)
Source: European Central Bank and EU area banks.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Euro Banking Association: cooperative body for large European banks for the transmission of 
euro-dominated payments; see section 4.1 EURO 1.  
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Figure 4.  Number of transactions in EU area payment 













1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Thousands
 1 National TARGET transactions
 2 Cross border, EU-wide TARGET transactions
 3 EBA EURO 1 (Euro Banking Association)
 4 PNS (Paris Net Settlement)
 5 SPI (Servicio de Pagos Interbancarios)
 6 POPS (Finnish interbank express transfer and cheque system)
Source: European Central Bank and EU area banks.  
 
 
In figures 2 and 3 the rise in values and numbers of domestic payments is due to 
the start of RTGS
plus. The increase for number of transactions in EURO 1 is quite 
clearly illustrated in figure 4. In EURO 1 the value of transactions have , by 
contrast, been quite stable. Large-value payment systems, excluding TARGET 
and EURO 1, play a smaller role in the processing of large-value payments. They 
are usually used domestically, and the values and numbers can be domestically 
significant but in the EU area context their role is rather small. 
 
 
3.1.2  National components of TARGET 
National RTGS systems in the European Union countries form a crucial part of 
the TARGET. Many of them have a pre-euro history. This means that they have 
existed as national large-value payment systems before the TARGET system went 
live in 1999. Although central banks have attempted to harmonise the functioning 
of national components, they still differ from each other. The reason for this is 
that when the EMU started there was a need to build rapidly and cost-effectively a 
trans-European payment system. This was achieved by harmonising only the 
crucial features of the systems, namely the features that concerned the 
implementation of ECB monetary policy and the level playing field for credit 
institutions. 
  Another unique feature of TARGET is that it operates over a larger area than 
the present 12 EMU countries. EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro 
also participate in the TARGET system. This stems from the fact that the time to  
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set up a system was limited and the countries were not certain of their adoption of 
euro before being forced to invest money to TARGET. 
  At present there are 15 countries participating in the TARGET. The names of 
each system and the payment flows are presented in table 3. This table also 
indicates the magnitude and relative importance of each individual system. For 
instance in Luxembourg the annual payment system turnover is 209 times greater 
than the annual GDP. In other words it takes only one day to process a value equal 
to Luxembourg’s annual GDP in the country’s national RTGS. 
 
Table 3.   Payment flows and GDP in EU countries, 2003 
 
Country Name  of 
system 









days to turn 
over annual 
GDP 
Luxembourg LIPS-Gross    206   4755    1 
Spain SLBE   95    70208    3 
France TBF    62    96327    4 
Germany RTGS
plus   60    128544    4 
Belgium ELLIPS   51   13558    5 
Netherlands TOP   47    21365    5 
Ireland IRIS    41    5502    6 
Finland BoF-RTGS    25    3645    10 
Portugal SPGT    25   3255    10 
Austria ARTIS   23    5177    11 
Greece HERMES    22    3343    12 
Great Britain  CHAPS Euro    20    31180    13 
Italy BI-REL    19    24761    13 
Denmark KRONOS    17    3208    15 
Sweden Euro  RIX    7   1897    36 
 
 
Figure 5.  Share of domestic and cross-border payments 






















Figure 5 shows market shares of the European RTGS systems by value at the end 
2003. About two-thirds of payments are made by three countries Germany, France 
and Spain. At 31%, Germany’s RTGS
plus system is by far the biggest in Europe. 
The figure also shows how split the market is. The seven systems whose 
processed value was the greatest are specified, while the rest are included in the 
others, slice, which represents only 7% of the total. 
  Figure 6 shows the market shares by number of transactions. Again two-thirds 
of the payments are made by three countries, but except for the same leading 
country, the other top three places are held by other national components than in 
figure 5. This emphasises the strong concentration of the figures in terms of 
transactions because almost half of the payments are made via national 
components of the German RTGS
plus system (49%). In the second place is Italy 
(14%) and in the third is the Netherlands (7%). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Share of number of domestic and cross-border 





























Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show only the magnitudes of euro-denominated payments sent 
through different national RTGS payment systems. These figures do not include 
the dual systems in the OUTS countries, where there is side by side a euro RTGS 
system and a national-currency RTGS system. Especially in the case of the United 
Kingdom, if the sterling RTGS system (CHAPS Sterling) were included, it would 
be the third biggest system after France in terms of value. The other OUT 
countries, Sweden and Denmark, do not play such a significant role. 
  
24 
Figure 7.  Value of RTGS transactions per direct participant, 
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Figure 7 shows the RTGS transactions with direct participants in each country. It 
also shows how different the local RTGS systems are in this respect. In Italy there 
are so many direct participants (682) that the RTGS transactions per direct 
participant are the lowest (EUR 36 billion) although the annual turnover per se is 
much higher than in many other countries. In countries where the number of 
participants is relatively low and turnover high, the transactions per direct 
participant are quite different. The biggest country in this respect is Germany 
where the figure is about 2178 billion euro. Of course also the OUTS countries, 
especially the UK, would show much bigger ratios if the flows of the national 
currency RTGS systems were incorporated in this same figure. 
  An interesting case for comparison is Belgium. The transactions are three 
times that of Finland although these two countries have practically the same 
number of participants. This is explained by the location of Euroclear Bank, the 
international central securities depository. Some Belgian banks are also known to 
have centralised their liquidity management, which could generate transactions in 
the local RTGS system. 
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Figure 8.  TARGET payments vs balance sheet total for 
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Figure 8 compares the total TARGET payments of the EU countries to the 
balance sheet totals of the respective monetary financial institutions. This 
comparison shows again how different these payment systems are. More than half 
of the countries (marked with asterisks), are situated in the same cluster close to 
the lower left hand corner of the figure. They are the countries with the lowest 
values of payments and low balance sheet totals. In this figure especially 
Germany, United Kingdom and France stand out from the crowd as the biggest 
countries in this respect. These are traditionally the main financial centres of 
Europe. The United Kingdom would be much farther to the right if the payments 
of the domestic RTGS in sterling were included. Spain is also interesting because 
it generates comparatively more large-value payments, despite a relatively small 
banking sector, in terms of assets. 
  Despite harmonisation efforts the statistics on domestic payments of national 
components of TARGET are not in all cases comparable. This stems from the fact 
that the different national central banks still have different practices in compiling 
their domestic statistics. Some central banks include transactions related to 
intraday credit, liquidity transfers, monetary policy operations, and the settlement 
of ancillary systems, while some others do not. Therefore statistics on domestic 
payments are not always comparable across countries. Figures for cross-border 
payments are more consistent across countries. They can be divided into customer 
and interbank payments. Both volumes and values are reported here. These 
payments are considered in the next paragraphs. 
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Table 4.   Importance of cross border payments by country, 
     2003 
 







Total (EUR bn)  Share of cross-
border payments 
value in total 
value, % 
Belgium    3 331    10 227    13 558    75.4 
Luxembourg   1  513   3  242   4  755    68.2 
Portugal   1  280   1  975   3  255    60.7 
Netherlands    9 494    11 871    21 365    55.6 
Austria   2  374   2  803   5  177    54.1 
Greece   1  724   1  620   3  343    48.4 
Finland   2  142   1  503   3  645    41.2 
Ireland   3  360   2  142   5  502    38.9 
Italy    16 303    8 458    24 761    34.2 
Germany    92 711    35 833    128 544    27.9 
France   77  081   19  246   96  327    20.0 
Spain    65 081    5 128    70 208    7.3 
United Kingdom    7 362    23 818    31 180    76.4 
Sweden    73   1  824   1  897    96.1 
Denmark    42   3  166   3  208    98.7 
 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of TARGET payments between domestic and 
cross-border payments. The importance of cross-border payments varies 
significantly between countries. The smaller countries seem to have relatively 
more cross border payments than the countries whose total turnover is high. 
  Especially in Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal the percentage of cross-
border payments is high. Of the IN countries two-thirds of the payments of 
Belgium and Luxembourg are also cross border payments. The opposite is the 
case for Spain, where domestic payments form the main part of total value of 
RTGS system. Also in France only 20% of the payments are cross-border 
payments. In Finland about 40% of the payments are cross-border payments. 
  The figures of the so-called OUTS countries (UK, Sweden and Denmark) 
cannot be compared with figures of IN countries because in the former the 
domestic payments are transferred in separate RTGS systems. The figure shows 
that more than three fourths of their payments go across the border.  
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Figure 9.  Daily average of cross-border TARGET payments 
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As can be seen from figure 9 the numbers and values of payments between 
different RTGS systems as a whole have been rising since the beginning of 
TARGET operations. The highest value was reached in December 2002. If the 
numbers and values of interbank and customer payments are compared, it can be 
seen that the numbers of customer payments have been rising steadily since the 
start of 1999. In terms of value, customer payments play a much lesser role and 
their value has remained fairly stable over the years. This trend of increasing 
values and numbers might change in the future due to the start of the CLS bank, 
although no such trend is yet visible. In principle the number of settlements for 
foreign exchange deals should decrease in TARGET because they are increasingly 
settled through the CLS system. Moreover, the revamping of the TARGET system 
(TARGET2) might lead to changes in numbers and values. 
 The  German  RTGS
plus system clearly processes the most payments in the EU 
in terms of value and transactions. This is the case for both domestic and cross-
border payments. The RTGS
plus belongs to the category of new hybrid systems. It 
started operations in 2001. The RTGS
plus is designed to contain the good features 
of an RTGS system, and to incorporate effective liquidity saving features that 
used to be found only in netting systems. The liquidity saving elements of the 
RTGS
plus are three fold. First, mutual cover dependencies are taken into account in 
the entry management procedure for incoming payments. There is also an ongoing 
resolution of offsetting positions in queue. In this offsetting process the payments 
are settled gross although the effect of offsetting resembles the liquidity saving 
elements of netting because the offsetting gross payments are self-collateralising. 
There is also an event-oriented optimisation of the payments in the express queue.  
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 The  RTGS
plus offers additional features, which are quite new to RTGS 
systems. There are control options by which participants can effectively control 
their liquidity flows. The RTGS
plus allows participants to choose their own 
individual combinations of control options as needed. Each participant can choose 
a total limit, bilateral sender limit, or multilateral sender limit. The total limit 
means that the liquidity above this pre-set limit is solely meant for express 
payments. Bilateral and multilateral sender limits are designed for more precise 
control of liquidity. The bilateral sender limit means that it can determine the 
payment amount a participant is willing to send to another participant. This sender 
limit can also be a multilateral limit, meaning that the limit applies to all other 
participants. In this way the sending party can effectively control its liquidity 
flows. 
  The payment flows of the RTGS
plus system are large compared to other 
payment systems in Europe. In terms of transactions the RTGS
plus accounts for 
about half of the transactions in TARGET. The annual turnover of the system is 
almost twice that of the next biggest (French) RTGS-system. Compared to other 
large value payment systems in Europe (transactions, both national and cross 
border payments), the RTGS
plus system has a share of 31% of the payments. 
 
Figure 10.  Outgoing TARGET payments from Germany, 
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Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
The volumes and values of the outgoing TARGET payments from Germany are 
shown in figure 10. The next largest RTGS systems in Europe are those of France 
and Spain. They are both traditional RTGS systems. Despite the differences in 
design vs. the German system, the statistics for each system suggest similar usage 
and trends. It seems that in these systems interbank payments account for the great  
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majority of payments in terms of value but in terms of transactions customer 
payments are increasing rapidly. 
  As for numbers of customer payments, the Spanish system and the two next 
biggest RTGS systems, of United Kingdom and Italy, there are more customer 
payments than interbank payments. This trend is very clear in all three systems. 
Of the smaller RTGS systems, those of Portugal and Greece, show very high 
ratios of customer payments. 
  This trend of increasing numbers of customer payments in RTGS systems is 
not consistent because there are several smaller RTGS systems where this is not 
the case. For example, for the Scandinavian countries including Finland, there are 
very stable numbers of customer payments. Transactions in the European RTGS 
systems show more similar patterns. In every system, in terms of value, the 
transmission of interbank payments is far greater than customer payments. 
 
Figure 11.  Outgoing TARGET payments from Finland, 
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Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
The Finnish RTGS system (BoF-RTGS) is the 10
th biggest RTGS system in 
Europe. As figure 11 shows about 42% of the value of payments is in cross-border 
payments, whereas in the Swedish and Danish systems almost all payments are 
cross-border payments. This is due to the fact that the OUT countries have other 
RTGS systems for their own currencies. In BoF-RTGS, the division between 
customer and interbank payments is clear. Over the years, the number of customer 
payments has slowly increased. There has also been a slight increase in the value 
of these payments. 
  The average increases in number of customer and interbank payments 
between 2002 and 2003 are shown in table 5. The table figures compare the  
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monthly figures for 2003 and 2002. The average numbers of customer payments 
have risen significantly in many countries. Especially in Sweden, Spain and 
United Kingdom, the increase in customer payments sent through the respective 
RTGS systems is remarkable. Also in many other countries the increase is 
significant. Only Austria, Denmark and Belgium show very modest growth 
figures. In this same period the growth rates for interbank payments have been 
more stable. Only Spain, Greece, United Kingdom and Ireland show two-digit 
growth rates. 
  This indicates that there is an increasing need for a fast real time payment 
system in Europe for customer payments even if the fee is higher than in many 
other cross-border payment systems. 
 
Table 5.   Average increase in number of customer and 
      interbank payments, 2003-2002 






Sweden   146.0    3.1 
Spain   65.7   20.1 
United  Kingdom   61.8   16.5 
Netherlands   50.5    -1.0 
Finland  43.4    4.6 
Ireland   34.5   12.7 
France   32.8   2.5 
Portugal  31.1    7.1 
Luxembourg   28.2    4.6 
Greece   27.2   23.8 
Italy   23.8    0.1 
Germany   21.4    4.8 
Austria   7.3   7.5 
Denmark   5.6    -3.4 
Belgium   -1.5    1.4 
 
 
In this section various aspects of RTGS systems in the EU have been examined. 
The main finding is the great differences that mark the present systems, in terms 
of numbers and values, as well as in how the systems are used (domestic or cross-
border payments). The market is also polarised in the sense that there are a few 
big players in the market and the rest are fairly small. 
  The designs of the systems, on the other hand, are basically the same. This is 
due to the fact that the TARGET Guideline requires all RTGS systems to provide 
similar services to all participants. These kinds of features are queuing, intraday 
credit, immediate finality, and use of collateral. Another similarity is that most of 
them use the Y-shaped message flow, although in some countries the V-shaped  
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design is used. The German RTGS
plus system differs from the others in the sense 
that there are also liquidity saving features such as bilateral and multilateral limits. 
 
 
3.2  Other RTGS systems operated by central banks 
3.2.1  Fedwire and CHIPS USA 
Fedwire system is the RTGS system in the USA. It is owned and operated by the 
12 regional Federal Reserve Banks of the Federal Reserve System. In the early 
1990s the Federal Reserve banks consolidated many aspects of the Fedwire 
system that had been separated and to operate and manage the payment services 
nationwide. Fedwire is mainly used for large-value, time-critical payments (such 
as securities transactions, loans, settlement of real estate transactions etc). 
  The system actually consists of three parts: Funds transfer-system, Book-
Entry Securities System and Net settlement. The Funds transfer-system is the 
system in which payments are transferred, while the Book-Entry Securities 
System is for electronic storage of securities records in custody accounts and for 
the transfer of securities between the counterparties.
10 Net settlement allows 
participants in private clearing arrangements – such as national ACH networks, 
credit card processors, ATM-networks, and securities transfer networks - to 
exchange and settle transactions on a net basis through reserve or clearing 
accounts. At present there are about 70 settlement arrangements using this facility. 
Net settlement includes three types of settlement service.
11 which vary 
operationally and by timing of finality. 
  Fedwire enables users to obtain intraday credit in the form of daylight 
overdrafts. An institution using this facility is required to establish a maximum for 
daylight overdrafts (net debit cap), which are granted at the discretion of the 
Federal Reserve Banks. Usually the central bank does not require institutions to 
pledge collateral to secure daylight overdrafts, but in some cases additional 
intraday credit beyond the net debit cap will require the pledge of collateral for 
this specific purpose. In order to use daylight overdrafts participants are required 
to pay a fee for the use of the facility. The fee is believed to encourage 
participants to reduce and continue to control daylight overdrafts and thus reduce 
the overall credit risk of the central bank. 
  More than 9,500 participants are currently able to transfer funds via Fedwire. 
In an average of 460,000 payments a day, valued at USD 1,700 billion, were 
transferred via Fedwire. The Fedwire securities service system processed daily 
                                                 
10 Usually the transfer is carried out in DvP-mode (delivery versus payment) where the securities 
are transferred simultaneously with the payment for the securities. 
11 The Settlement Sheet Service, Fedwire-Based Settlement Service and Net Settlement Service.  
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about 59,800 securities transfers, with a total value of USD 846 billion. The 
National Settlement Service
12 processes ninety settlements per day with a total 
value of USD 30 billion. 
  Fedwire is mainly geared for domestic payments. Cross-border payments are 
mainly processed in CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System). 
Actually 95% of the dollar payments moving between countries worldwide are 
handled in this system, which is owned by the banks. The system also transmits 
interbank payments and customer payments. Domestic payments are also 
transferred trough this system. 
  CHIPS is a new hybrid payment system, a so-called CNS system (continuous 
net settlement), which has evolved from the DNS system. In this system 
multilateral netting takes place continually and usually most of the payments are 
settled already during the morning hours. This is possible because cover for 
payments must be present in a participant’s account when transfers are made. The 
payments are final when the payment has been processed by the system. The 
system transfers on average 250,000 transactions daily, valued at USD 1.2 trillion. 
 
Figure 12.  Fedwire, number and value of payment 



















Source: Federal Reserve System.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Net Settlement Service offers finality equal to Fedwire funds transfer system and provides an 
automated mechanism for submitting settlement files to Reserve Banks.  
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Figure 13.  CHIPS, number and value of payment 





















3.2.2 BOJ-Net  Japan 
The BOJ-NET (Bank of Japan Financial Network System) is the RTGS system 
used in Japan. The system was introduced in 1988 and provided DNS and RTGS 
mode for settlement. Because of the risks associated with DNS, it was abolished 
and a new RTGS system was introduced at the start of 2001. The BOJ-NET 
comprises two systems: one for funds transfers (BOJ-NET Funds Transfer 
System) and one for the settlement of Japanese government securities (BOJ-NET 
JGB Services). Typically, the payments processed are connected with interbank 
money market and securities transactions, settlement of net positions of privately 
owned clearing systems, and fund transfers between banks and the central bank, 
and payments between the accounts in the institution. 
  Almost all payments are processed on an RTGS basis. Some of the payments 
between participants and the central bank are netted on a bilateral basis between 
the participants and the central bank. These settlements occur simultaneously at 
designated times during the day and is final once the payments are processed. 
  When the new RTGS system commenced operations at the start of 2001 the 
Bank of Japan also initiated an intraday overdraft facility to ensure the smooth 
operation of the new system. This facility is offered to all participants without 
charge and is fully collateralised. Intraday overdrafts are also available as part of 
the simultaneous DVP processing and the collateralisation (SPDC) scheme. Using 
SPDC a participant in BOJ-NET JGB Services can send or receive securities 
traded in DVP transactions as collateral to obtain or repay intraday funds needed 
for payments in the transactions concerned. 
  The daily average value of transactions settled in the BOJ-NET Funds 
Transfer System was JPY 77 trillion (EUR 0,571 trillion) in 2001. The total value  
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of payments in 2000 was JPY 142,7 trillion (1,116 trillion EUR), and the number 
of transactions was 19013. The reason for the significant decrease in value of 
payments at the beginning of 2001 was the changeover to the new RTGS-system. 
At present, call money transactions are settled directly between lender and 
borrower without money market dealers as intermediaries. Prior the changeover 
these transactions were settled via these ‘tanshi’ money market dealers. 
 
Figure 14.  BOJ-NET, number and value of transactions, 





















Source: Bank of Japan.  
 
 
3.2.3  Swiss Interbank Clearing Switzerland 
The Swiss Interbank Clearing System (SIC) is one of the oldest RTGS systems. It 
started operations in 1987. The participants process large-value payment 
transactions as well as part of their bulk payments via SIC. The system transmits 
customer payments, settlement payments between participants, cash legs of 
securities transactions, and payments related to correspondent banking activities. 
The system is operated by a separate operator. 
  The system was originally designed according to three principles: no intraday 
overdrafts, queuing mechanism, and FIFO (first in, first out) payment processing 
and settlement. The FIFO rule was relaxed in early 1990 so that banks were able 
to assign different priorities to their payments. 
  Also the prohibition of intraday overdrafts (intraday credit) was dropped in 
1999 when the Swiss central bank began to offer SIC participants interest-free 
intraday liquidity via intraday repos. The reason for the change was the increase in 
time-critical payments, with special attention being given to CLS-payments. 
  The account structure of the SIC is somewhat special. Each participant has 
two accounts, one of which is called the master account and the other the SIC 
account. Transferring funds to the SIC account (which is for the settlement of  
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payments), starts the settlement cycle. A participant can freely transfer funds 
between the accounts. At the end of the day the balances in the SIC accounts are 
transferred to the master accounts. 
  The SIC system is an online system that operates around the clock on all 
working days. A payment order can be entered five days prior to its value date. 
Settlement is carried out during a 22-hour cycle. When payments are executed by 
the system they are final and irrevocable. If there is not enough cover for a 
payment it is automatically held pending. Attempts to settle payments in a queue 
are automatic. It is also possible to cancel the payments in a queue. In addition to 
queuing, there is a bilateral offsetting function in the system. If there is not 
sufficient cover for a payment the system checks whether there is a corresponding 
offsetting payment from the beneficiary to the sender at the top of its queue. If 
there is a payment going in the other direction, the two payments are offset. 
  The pricing structure of SIC system is progressive. This method is applied in 
order to prevent gridlock situations. The structure is designed so that the fees 
increase during the day. This induces banks to settle their payments as early as 
possible during the day. There are also different fees for small- and large-value 
payments. The threshold is CHF 100,000. 
  The size of the payments transferred through the system varies greatly. 
Almost all payments (more than 90%) are for les than CHF 100,000 limit. The 
majority of payments are in fact much smaller, ie less than the CHF 5,000 
threshold. In the value terms, the situation is quite different. Almost the entire 
turnover accounted for by a small number of payments that exceed CHF 1 million. 
  By payment type (customer payments, payments to SIC participants, cover 
payments, cash legs of securities transactions and correspondent banking 
payments), most of the payments are customer payments. About two-thirds of 
value of the payments is in those related to cross-border payments, which 
indicates the importance of foreign exchange transactions in the SIC. 
  To the Swiss banks the euro is in many ways a very important currency; 
hence the need for an easy access to TARGET. The Swiss banks have set up a 
special clearing bank in Frankfurt, the Swiss Euro Clearing Bank (SECB), which 
offers euro clearing services to Swiss banks. The SECB runs the euroSIC, through 
which many Swiss banks execute their euro payments. The transaction volume of 
euroSIC was EUR 1.5 billion 2001. 
  In 2001 the average daily number of transactions in SIC was 644,000. and the 
average daily value was CHF 182 billion (EUR 122,4 billion). In recent years the 
processing of interbank services for retail payment transactions has been 
incorporated in the system. Because SIC processes nearly all interbank 




Figure 15.  SIC, number and value of payment transactions, 





















Source: Swiss National Bank.   
 
 
3.2.4  Basic statistics for the systems 
Figure 16.  SIC, Fedwire, TARGET, CHIPS, BOJ-NET: 
      number of payment transactions, 
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Figure 17.  Fedwire, TARGET, CHIPS, BOJ-NET, SIC: 
      value of payment transactions, 
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The statistics for systems in the USA, Japan and Switzerland show clearly how 
differently the main payment systems are used in different countries. SIC system 
has the highest average number of transactions and the lowest average value of 
payments. The high number of transactions in SIC reflects its use for low-value 
payments such as customer-related payments, whose value is usually under EUR 
3,400. Fedwire is used mainly to process domestic large-value time-critical 
payments. The size of the US economy is reflected in the values and numbers for 
the system. 
  TARGET-ranks third in transactions narrowly ahead of CHIPS and second in 
terms of value. Of these five systems, TARGET is the only one showing an 
increase in value. 
 
 
4  Principles and recent developments in large-
value payment systems operated by the private 
sector 
Besides TARGET with its national components, there are a number of large-value 
payment systems operating in the EMU countries. Some of them are solely for the 





4.1 EURO  1 
EURO1 is an EU-wide same day payment system based on single payment 
messages. It was established through the co-operation of European banks under 
the auspices of the EBA and handles large and medium-sized euro-denominated 
payments. Besides TARGET, EURO1 is a main cross-border payment system 
operating within the EU area. From the beginning of 1999, EURO1 took over for 
the previous ECU Clearing and Settlement System. By the beginning of 2004, the 
system already had 111 members. 
  EURO1 is an information-messaging infrastructure based on the SWIFT 
network already used in international banking. Member banks of the EURO1 
system are able to send end-to-end payment messages directly to receiving banks. 
The EURO1 interface calculates members’ bilateral positions on a real-time basis 
and limit checks on participating parties’ liquidity. In order to reduce risk each 
bank is assigned a limit, which it cannot exceed during the day. At the end of the 
day, banks with debit positions transfer funds via their respective national central 
banks’ TARGET settlement systems to EURO1 accounts at the ECB, after which 
banks with bilateral credit positions receive funds via TARGET. 
  EURO 1 is based on the Single Obligation Structure. This means that at any 
moment each participating bank has only one position (positive or negative) vis-à-
vis all other participating banks. That position changes in real time with every 
payment received or sent. Payments are final and irrevocable as soon as they are 
processed. 
  As a means of reducing credit and liquidity risks, each bank sets a bank-
specific credit limit (EUR 5–30 million) for each of the other banks. Each bank 
then has two total limits: the sum of all credit limits granted to and by it, vis-à-vis 
all the other banks. Neither limit can exceed EUR 1 billion. 
  In order to ensure success of end-of-day settlements, even when some banks 
lack sufficient liquidity, the ECB maintains a liquidity pool (EUR 1 bn), to which 
all the banks contribute equal amounts. If the pool proves to be insufficient, the 
participating banks are obliged to cover the shortfall. 
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Figure 18.  Number and value of payments in EURO 1, 
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Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
The values for EURO 1 have in the recent years been around EUR 180–215 
billion. The values seem at present to be fairly stable. On the other hand the 
number of payments has been increasing. 
 
 
4.2  Paris Net Settlement system (PNS) 
The Paris Net Settlement system is the French large-value payment system which 
operates in France along with the French RTGS system, TBF. An interbank body 
owned by ten banks (Centrale des règlements interbancaires, CRI), owns the PNS. 
  The PNS processes customer and interbank credit transfers. The system 
frequently handles also liquidity transfers to and from the RTGS system, TBF. 
Everyday at the opening, the banks are obliged to transfer liquidity from their 
TBF accounts to their account in the PNS system. There are no upper or lower 
limits on the value of payments. 
  The PNS can be defined as a hybrid settlement system because it offers 
netting mechanisms and at the same time the payments are settled in real time. 
The payments are processed one by one on a continuous basis. Each payment that 
meets the settlement criteria is settled immediately. Others are put in a queue 
where the payments are scanned continuously for settlement. 
  The main risk control feature is that the system offers irrevocable settlement 
in central bank money. In addition, PNS offers two types of caps, which are set by 
users to mitigate their credit and liquidity risks. Each bank can set the maximum 
amount it will pay to its counterparties before receiving payments from them. It is  
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also possible to set bilateral caps on other participants, thus reducing the 
counterparty risk. 
 
Figure 19.  Number and value of outgoing payments in PNS, 
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Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
In recent years the payment values in the PNS have been around EUR 70–90 




4.3  Spanish large-value payment system SPI 
(Spanish Interbank Payment Service) 
SPI operates in Spain alongside the Spanish RTGS system, SLBE. The 
participants own the system. The types of payments settled through SPI are 
different than those for other national large-value payments. Most of the payments 
can be regarded as cross-border payments because they are related to transfers to 
or from accounts held in Spain by non-residents. The small number of domestic 
transactions is related to settlement of the euro leg of foreign exchange 
transactions, the exchange of cheques and the settlement of securities trades. The 
SPI is owned and run by its participants. 
  In SPI the payments are settled and the net positions of the participants are 
calculated continuously throughout the day. If a payment is put in a queue, 
bilateral or multilateral optimisation procedures can be used to settle the payment. 
The settlement takes place at the end of the day, when the short and long positions 
are calculated and settled.  
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  Two different limits reduce the credit and liquidity risks: a bilateral credit 
limit and a multilateral debit limit. The bilateral limit is the largest credit position 
a participant is ready to accept vis-a-vi another participant. The multilateral limit 
is 5% of the aggregate amount of bilateral limits. This limit gives the maximum 
overall debit position a participant can have. 
  There are also measures in place that ensure that settlement takes place even if 
one of the participants fails to meet its obligations. Firstly the participants have to 
establish guarantees in favour of the system and secondly the participants must 
sign an agreement obliging them to cover the shortfall if any participant fails to 
meet its payment obligations. 
 
Figure 20.  Number and value of outgoing payments in SPI, 
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Source: European Central Bank.  
 
 
In SPI the overall average monthly value of the payments has been decreasing 
slightly in the past few years, being on average a little over EUR 1 billion per 
month. The overall number of payments is at present around 7,000. 
 
 
4.4  Finnish large-value payment system, POPS 
POPS is the Finnish interbank system, which handles customer payments related 
to express transfers and cheques (including bank drafts). The participating banks 
own and operate the system. The banks participating in POPS send payment  
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messages bilaterally to each other without a centralised clearing house or a 
clearing operator.
13 
  POPS is a real-time, decentralised funds transfer system, based on bilateral 
exchange of data. The member banks send payment instructions directly to each 
other. The settlement of payments takes place in the Finnish RTGS system, BoF-
RTGS, on a gross or net basis, depending on the value to be transferred. Should 
the transfer exceed the mutually agreed gross limit, settlement is made as a gross 
payment via the BoF-RTGS. Smaller payments are bilaterally netted. The bilateral 
debit or credit positions are continuously updated during the day on the basis of 
the transferred payments. Once a bilaterally agreed net debit limit is reached, a 
transfer that reduces the net obligation is made via the BoF-RTGS. The rest of the 
bilateral obligations are cleared at the end of the day. 
  By means of bilateral limits each bank controls the size of its bilateral net 
positions against other participants. Two kinds of limits are used: the RTGS limit 
and the credit limit. The RTGS limit is equal to half of the bilateral credit limit. 
Limits are set through bilateral negotiations between the banks involved. 
  The RTGS limit determines the maximum size for single payments, which 
can still be settled on a net basis (payments larger than the RTGS limit are settled 
on a gross basis). The RTGS limit also functions as the signal, which triggers the 
settlement of bilateral net balances during the day. Whenever the bilateral credit 
amount rises above the RTGS limit, the intraday settlement procedure is applied: 
the indebted party sends a settlement transaction through the RTGS system. 
Intraday settlement transactions are always of the same size, which is the RTGS 
limit. The credit limit determines the amount above which the bilateral net 
balance cannot rise. If the credit limit is reached, the risk-taking bank will reject 
transactions increasing the net balance. 
  Settlement of POPS payments takes place in the RTGS system: 
 
1.  during the day whenever the bilateral net position exceeds the signal for the 
RTGS limit 
2.  during the day whenever the size of a single payment exceeds the RTGS limit 
3.  at the end of the day when bilateral balances are settled to zero 
 
In practice the bilateral net credit position varies during the day between zero and 
the RTGS limit. The overall maximum credit risk accepted by any bank is the sum 
of the granted bilateral limits, but the risks are, in fact, much lower due to the 
continuous netting process and the fact that the bilateral positions vary continually 
from the debit to the credit side during the day. 
 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed description of POPS, see Koskenkylä Heikki (ed.) Finnish Financial 
Markets 2002; Bank of Finland series A:105.  
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The numbers in the POPS-system are usually a little below 50,000 mark and 
values are usually EUR 30–40 billion, so the monthly figures are fairly stable. The 
yearly exceptional peak in POPS transactions in June is due to the increase in 
numbers of bank draft orders. Bank drafts are a traditional school graduation gift 
in Finland. However these do not actually show up in POPS transaction values, 
due to their relatively moderate face value. 
 
Figure 22.  Number of POPS transactions, 
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Figure 23.  Value of POPS transactions, 
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5 CLS  system 
The CLS system is quite different from other payment systems described above. It 
is used only for the settlement of foreign-exchange (FX) deals between 
participating banks. Worldwide foreign exchange trading between banks amounts 
on average to about USD 1,200 billion daily. Although the numbers of foreign 
exchange deals have been steadily growing, the payments related to the settlement 
of such deals have been conducted in essentially the same way for a couple of 
hundred years. 
  It has long been possible to settle other interbank payments, retail payments 
and other payments without settlement risk. Traditionally, the two payments 
related to a foreign exchange transaction are conducted separately. Thus it is 
possible that one of the two counterparties will not receive the currency it has paid 
for. This is called the settlement risk. This risk can now be reduced also in foreign 
exchange deals in eleven currencies, since the CLS bank started operations in 
September 2002. At first the eligible currencies were AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, 
JPY, GBP, USD but new currencies were included in mid-2003 when the 
Scandinavian currencies (DKK, SEK, NOK) and Singapore dollar were added. 
  The CLS bank offers PVP-based (payment versus payment) settlement 
services for foreign-exchange trades between the banks. In PVP-based settlement 
the transfer of both payments takes place simultaneously and thus the settlement 
risk is eliminated. 
  There are three types of users of CLS. Settlement Members are shareholders 
of CLS Group Holdings. Each Settlement Member has a multi-currency account  
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with the CLS Bank to which it has direct access and can submit payment 
instructions directly to CLS Bank on its own or customers behalf. User Members 
can also submit settlement instructions for themselves and their customers, but 
they do not have accounts with the CLS Bank. A User Member submits payment 
instructions through a selected Settlement Member who authorises the instructions 
for settlement. Other financial institutions can also have their FX deals settled 
through the CLS. This can be accomplished by making a customer agreement 
with one of the Settlement Members or User Members. Such arrangements do not 
directly involve the CLS. These financial institutions are called Third party 
members. There can also be other customers in the chain of customer members 
(fourth party members). 
  Settlement instructions are submitted to CLS Bank until 6.30 CET on the 
settlement day. Although instructions for every foreign exchange deal are 
matched and settled gross the funding is organised according to the multilateral 
net positions of each member in each currency. CLS Bank calculates the net 
amounts owed or due to each bank in each currency. For funding CLS sets a pay-
in schedule according to which settlement members provide funds. Each 
Settlement Member provides sufficient funding to maintain at all times a net 
positive position with the CLS Bank. The pay-ins go to CLS central bank account 
via Settlement Members’ national RTGS systems and are automatically credited 
to Settlement Members’ accounts at CLS. 
  Once the first pay-ins arrive the execution starts. This is a continuous process 
in which funding is received from Settlement Members and instructions are 
settled and pay-outs go to Settlement Members. Risk control algorithms are used 
to ensure that each Settlement Member has a net positive balance across all 
currencies combined. A Settlement Member’s short position in any given 
currency may not exceed a previously agreed limit for that currency, and the sum 
of currency limits must not exceed a limit set by the CLS. 
  At the start of 2004 the CLS was settling on average 100,000 payment 
instructions each day with a gross value of about USD 1 billion. A new record for 
the number and value of payment instructions settled in one day was reached on 
20 of January 2004 when the CLS Bank settled 262,756 payment instructions with 
a gross value of USD 2,175 billion. This new record was due to a public holiday 
in the US on 19 January. 
  The average figures are likely to grow when new currencies, Settlement 
Members and third parties take part in the system. A US financial technology 
research house in 2003 did a survey of the 40 CLS Bank’s Settlement Members.
14 
To the survey indicates that daily instructions will amount to 100,000 by mid-
2003 and 150,000 by mid-2004. By mid-2005 the number should reach 176.000 
                                                 
14 See www.cls-services.com/news.  
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6  Prospects for the future 
It seems that there will be significant changes in the payment systems industry in 
the near future. Options for many areas are still open but some trends are visible. 
The integration process is continuing and it will inevitably lead both large-value 
and small-value payments into more consolidated payment systems. This will 
mean fewer payment systems, but the values and numbers of processed payments 
in these systems will be huge, and this will increase the importance of oversight. 
The distinction between large- and small- value payments may eventually 
diminish and payments may be categorised more by the payment type as the 
systems become more specialised (eg interbank payments in TARGET2, FX deals 
in CLS and customer payments in pan-European ACH, PEACH). But it is 
important in this environment, with fewer payment systems, that the needs of 
different users be respected. As described in section 3.1, the use of the present 
TARGET system is quite different across the EU countries. Therefore the user’s 
requirements for the new TARGET2 system are also quite different. This brings 
big challenges for the design of the new system. 
  The whole business of payment transfers has been in turmoil in recent years, a 
situation that will continue for some years yet. This is due to several new trends in 
the payment systems environment. One obvious factor is globalisation and 
economic integration in the EU area. This has an effect on many aspects of 
payment systems. It means more bank mergers across borders, which in turn 
means new needs for banks to use payment systems because a bank that is present 
in many countries will seek payment system solutions that will work in many 
countries simultaneously and thus help the bank to reduce operational costs. This 
leads to inevitable internationalisation and consolidation of payment systems 
because banks that are located in different countries need an efficient way of 
transmitting payments via a single interface. 
  There is also increasing pressure from the European Union and the 
regulators to form a single domestic market across the whole EU area. One 
manifestation of this is the EU regulation on bank cards and low-value credit 
transfers, which stipulates that, within the EU area, the fee charged for a domestic  
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credit transfer or bank card transaction must be the same as that for a cross border 
payment.
15 
  This movement toward pricing all payments similarly regardless of 
destination in the EU area could, among other things, give rise to the need to 
develop also large-value payments so as to be more efficient and encompassing. 
This could steer us to a situation where just two or three large payment systems 
handle the payments within the EU area and the larger payment systems handle 
both small- and large-value payments. 
  The regulatory environment is changing rapidly in the EU area. This has 
an impact on payment systems as well. One of the major changes is the new Basel 
Capital Accord II-proposal.
16 This new general framework for capital adequacy 
requirements also covers payment systems. It has been intended to include banks' 
operational risks in the scope of capital adequacy regulation so that these would 
be subject to quantitative capital requirements. The risks in payment and 
settlement systems are regarded mainly as operational risks. So, due to this more 
risk conscious regulation, the knowledge, control and curtailment of operational 
risks in payment systems will receive even more emphasis in the future. The 
collection of data needed to assess these risks will also be emphasised in the 
future. 
  Another regulatory change is driven by the European Commission, which is 
preparing a broad legal framework for the EU area. This new legal framework is 
aimed at harmonising the legal basis for the whole area. This effort also brings 
new requirements to all payments systems in the area, which will shape their 
design towards more harmonised features. 
  Another driver for change is the rapid development of IT, which makes it 
easier to develop simple, efficient and safe payment systems. For example, 
network technology makes it possible to make the payment systems more real-
time based and efficient
17 and new encryption technologies help to make the 
systems safer. The new technologies also make it easier to modify the systems 
because of the modular design. This contributes to the fact that there is a lower 
threshold for starting new designs and altering existing ones. This will mean a 
                                                 
15 This has already had an impact on payment systems transmitting small-value payments. The EU 
banks are now hastily developing new systems for transferring payments in order to contain the 
losses from being forced to reduce cross-border prices to levels that, using the old payment system 
structures is simply not profitable. 
16 For more information, see BIS consultative document ‘Overview of the New Basel Capital 
Accord’; April 2003. 
17 One example is the E-Settlement model See Harry Leinonen – Veli-Matti Lumiala – Riku 
Sarlin: Settlement in modern network based payment infrastructures – description and prototype of 
the E-Settlement model, Bank of Finland Discussion Paper, 23/2002 and Harry Leinonen: Re-
engineering Payment Systems for the E-world, Bank of Finland Discussion Paper, 17/2000.  
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faster cycle for creating new designs and making the life cycle of existing systems 
shorter than before. 
  The entry of new member states into the EU this year also puts pressure on 
existing payment systems. Instead of using their old payment systems (which 
though in many cases are modern) with new interfaces, these new member 
countries may want to have new payment systems better suited the EU 
environment. This would create an even greater need for truly EU-wide payment 
systems that can handle payments across the whole area efficiently and safely
18. 
This might provide an opportunity to new vendors in this business area, leaving 
banks and central banks behind in technical knowledge and offering new products 
to those who need them. Also, when the market becomes more harmonised, the 
competition between different systems will increase, which might in the end lead 
to some consolidation of the payment systems. 
  Because the whole payment system market is in turmoil, there could be a 
reshuffling of the game cards in the offing. Banks might find it beneficial to 
outsource parts of their payment system value chain to other banks or new 
actors in this field to achieve economies of scale. The whole value chain of 
making payments is being cut into pieces, and this could mean that some new 
actors might find new opportunities for themselves in this field. 
  Customer point of view and efficiency are taken more into consideration. 
The customer point of view should encompass both the bank’s needs and their 
customers’ needs. In the past, risk reduction and liquidity savings have been 
considered the most important features of large-value payment systems. But when 
the market structures and environment are in turmoil there could be more need to 
explore what banks and customers really want from payment systems and what 
should be the price for using them. One reflection of this is the consolidating 
securities settlement industry, which also uses the services of payment systems to 
transfer settlement funds and their coming need to make intraday payments in the 
EU area. 
  The border line between large-value payments and small-(retail) value 
payments could become more blurred, at least in privately operated payment 
systems. This trend can already be seen in the EURO 1, which is basically a large-
value payment system. It is customary that banks participating in EURO 1 also 
exchange small-value payments trough this system. The motivation for this 
behaviour is that it is easy to use the same interface and it is also a fast way of 
moving funds. Another motivating factor is new technology that enables the 
handling of large quantities of payments efficiently and without risks. The owner 
of EURO 1, the EBA, has also developed two small-value payment systems, 
STEP1- and STEP2. STEP2 is the first system that is able to batch process 
                                                 
18 An example of a new RTGS system for one country is Lithuania’s new LITAS system, which 
was introduced in January 2004.  
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payments destined to any country in the EU area. It is likely that also for this 
small-value payments sector there will be some competition as the market size for 
small- and medium-value payments is quite large. 
  TARGET is also in the process of changing. The planning of the new 
TARGET system, TARGET2, began in October 2002, when the Governing 
Council of the ECB decided on the long-term strategy for TARGET. The new 
strategy was based on the idea that the Eurosystem should promote increasing 
financial integration. The new system will offer the users a more harmonised 
service level across countries. The efficiency of the system is also of greater 
concern than before. The new system will also be developed so that adoption to 
future changes, such as enlargement of the EU, is easy. 
  The views of TARGET users have already been taken into consideration by 
arranging public consultation before the project plan was published. The new 
system is envisaged to consist of a single shared platform that is technically based 
on the largest existing RTGS systems in Europe. The services offered are to be 
more harmonised than before. The new system is scheduled to be up and running 
in the latter half of this decade. 
  TARGET2 brings considerable changes to the present situation 
regarding the large-value payments market in the EU. The size of the payment 
will not be restricted in TARGET2, which will handle also small payments. As 
the statistics for the TARGET cross-border payments show, the number of 
customer payments has been on the rise in the last few years. The same thing has 
happened with EURO 1. The values of customer payments and the values and 
numbers of interbank payments have remained fairly stable in both systems. This 
could indicate that there really is a need for a fast and reliable way of executing 
customer payments. The future will tell which of the systems, TARGET or EURO 
1, or some other system, will handle the major part of these payments. But it is 
likely that the services offered by the new TARGET2 will steer its usage more to 
the large-value interbank business. 
  The CLS-system has been functioning for more than a year. The use of the 
system has increased steadily, but it is difficult to foresee what the future holds. 
Due to its young age, there are still some challenges ahead for the system. To be 
able to reduce the settlement risk of foreign-exchange transactions effectively 
the scope of the CLS system should be extended and the usage widened. Initially 
the CLS settled in seven currencies. Including new currencies for settlement 
should extend the scope. Six new currencies have been accepted by the CLS 
(Swedish krona, Danish kroner, Norwegian krone and the Singapore, Hong Kong 
and New Zealand dollars). They will be implemented subject to meeting various 
operational, technical and legal requirements. Already in September 2003 the 
Nordic currencies and Singapore dollar were implemented as new CLS 
currencies.  
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  Another way of enhancing the scope of CLS is to enlarge the group of CLS 
users and in this way entice more business to CLS, albeit many of the biggest 
foreign-exchange banks in the world are already members of CLS. In the future a 
more important issue is the third party market, in which settlement members sell 
their services to third banks. The third parties were accepted to trade for CLS 
settlement in November 2002, but this market has not yet developed well. The 
third party market has great potential for bringing more foreign-exchange deals to 
the CLS but getting customers as third party members presents a challenge for the 
CLS and settlement members. The difficulty lies in justifying the benefits of 
joining the CLS as a third party member. This is because risk reduction in foreign 
exchange transactions is difficult to price. Third party members also face costs 
when joining the system as a third party member and there are no obvious 
revenues to be gained because risk reduction is not included in the price of a 
foreign-exchange deal. 
  Also the settlement members of the CLS face considerable costs when they 
join the system, nor are they able to obtain any measurable advantage in the risk 
reduction. But the picture is somewhat different for them because there are other 
measurable advantages involved. A survey done by a US financial technology 
research house
19 reveals that Settlement Members desire primarily an increase in 
the number of currencies settled through CLS Bank. The three main motives for 
joining were the reduction of settlement risk, avoidance of regulatory action, and 
efficiency (to improve STP rates and reduce errors). The main benefit of 
providing third party services was that it enables a strong customer relationship to 
be formed, which may be leveraged into other business areas. The next couple of 
years will show whether profit-oriented banks will find it favourable to join the 
CLS as third parties. 
  The CLS system is presently geared for reduction of the settlement risk of 
foreign-exchange risk, but in future, if it can prove its reliability and efficiency, 
there could be possibilities for extending the services also to other business 
areas. In banking business there are other two-sided transactions (Delivery versus 
Payment) that would technically quite easily fit into the CLS processes. One is the 
settlement of securities transactions where DvP is a common form of settlement. 
The ongoing globalisation of securities trade could create a need for a centralised 
settlement system, which would settle securities transactions globally without any 
settlement risk in real time. It is also possible that the CLS system will some day 
be used for the control of intraday credits used by banks. Securities held with in 
the CLS system could be used as collateral against which the banks could be 
granted intra day credit. This would make the CLS system a global collateral pool. 
There are also other financial products which would benefit from improved 
clearing and settlement infrastructure. One example is mutual fund shares, which 
                                                 
19 See www.cls-services.com/news for more information.  
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are in need of a new infrastructure. This has been examined by the International 
Securities Services Association (ISSA)
20. 
  In February 2004 the CLS Bank introduced a new feature to their services. 
This is called the enhanced fund FX transaction facility, which enables fund 
managers to settle foreign exchange transactions through CLS Bank via their CLS 
service provider. This gives fund managers the benefit that they can eliminate FX 
settlement risk in cross-border investment or hedging. 
  The SWIFT system (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) was established in the early 1970s. The idea was to exploit 
the emerging computer technology and use it, instead of telex, for sending 
standardised financial messages between financial institutions, securely and 
reliably. For decades SWIFT messages were used for international payments 
because the local payment systems used their own standards for sending 
payments. Today SWIFT enables more than 7,500 financial institutions in over 
199 countries to exchange financial data reliably and securely
21. The newer 
payment systems generally use SWIFT messaging services as a messaging hub. 
Also the newest payment systems such as STEP2, which was set up to process 
payments inside the EU, use SWIFT’s services. So it is possible that some time in 
the future the standards used by SWIFT will become industry standards both in 
cross-border payments as well as in domestic payments. The use of one 
supplier worldwide is of course efficient, but this might also entail some risks 
inherent in the monopolistic situation. 
  From the Finnish point of view the above-mentioned prospects for the future 
have similar ramifications in Finland. The Finnish large-value payment systems 
will be especially affected by economic integration in the EU area, the changing 
regulatory environment, and the upcoming new TARGET2. Some of these above-
discussed trends are already visible in Finnish payment systems. For example 
efficiency and the use of state-of-the-art technology have been common in Finnish 
payment systems already for several years. In the context of designing the new 
EU wide-payment systems, this makes the Finnish market somewhat special 
because efficiency and the use of modern technology are not so extensive in other 
countries.  This might mean that from the Finnish point of view the 
development could go backwards. This is a major challenge for Finland as, a 
small country, to make sure that the new developing payment systems are also, 
from Finnish point of view, more efficient and user friendly than the present 
payment systems. It is also evident that Finnish payment systems will change 
considerably due to the change in this area. The BoF-RTGS system will be 
replaced by the new TARGET2 system. This will also change the other large 
value payment system in Finland, POPS. If the whole system is not changed, at 
                                                 
20 ISSA Symposium June 12–14, 2002 UBS Wolfsberg Centre. 
21 See www.swift.com.  
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least the settlement leg of POPS has to be modified to meet the requirements of 
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Abbreviations used in the text 
ACH =  Automated  clearing  House 
ATM  =  Automated Teller Machinen 
ARTIS  =  RTGS system for Austria 
BoF-RTGS  =  RTGS system for Finland 
BOJ-Net  =  RTGS system for Japan 
BI-REL  =  RTGS system for Italy 
CHAPS Euro  =  RTGS system for Great Britain 
CHIPS  =  Clearing House Interbank Payment system, USA 
CLS  =  Continuous Linked Settlement 
CNS  =  Continuous net settlement system 
DNS  =  Deferred Net settlement system 
DVP  =  Delivery versus payment 
EAF  =  Euro Access Frankfurt, a large value payment system replaced 
by the RTGSplus 
ECB =  European  Central  Bank 
EBA  =  Euro Banking Association 
ELS  =  Euro Link System, a large value payment system replaced by 
RTGSplus 
ELLIPS  =  RTGS system for Belgium 
EMU  =  Economic and Monetary Union 
EURO 1  =  EBA’s system for handling large-value euro payments 
Euro RIX  =  RTGS system for Sweden 
FIFO  =  First in-First out 
HERMES  =  RTGS system for Greece 
IRIS  =  RTGS system for Ireland 
ISSA  =  International Securities Services Association; international 
cooperative body for securities depositories 
KRONOS  =  RTGS system for Denmark 
LIPS-Gross  =  RTGS system for Luxembourg 
LHS =  Left-hand  side 
PEACH  =  Pan European Automated Clearing House 
POPS  =  Finnish banks’ system for online express transfers and cheques 
PNS  =  Paris Net Settlement System 
PVP  =  Paymen versus Payment 
RHS =  Right-hand  side 
RTGS  =  Real-Time Gross Settlement System 
RTGSplus  =  RTGS system for Germany  
57 
SEPA  =  Single Euro Payments Area 
SIC  =  RTGS system for Switzerland 
SLBE  =  RTGS system for Spain 
SPI  =  Servicio de Pagos Interbancarios, Spanish large value payment 
system 
SPGT  =  RTGS system for Portugal 
STEP 1  =  EBA system for small-value euro payments 
SWIFT  =  Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication, which maintains a worldwide network for 
interbank information exchange 
TARGET  =  Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement 
Express Transfer System 
TARGET2  =  New TARGET system 
TBF  =  RTGS system for France 
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